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Bah, El-hadj, Brada, Josef C., and Yigit, Taner—With a little help from our friends: The
effect of USAID assistance on SME growth in a transition economy
Using survey data on Macedonian ﬁrms that participated in USAID programs providing
technical and ﬁnancial assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and on
ﬁrms that did not, we estimate the effectiveness of such assistance in increasing the
growth of employment in the assisted ﬁrms. We control for selection bias in program par-
ticipation and use both kernel and caliper propensity score matching to estimate the excess
growth of employment in assisted ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that assistance programs raised employ-
ment growth by 16–20 percentage points in the ﬁrst year after assistance and by 26–30
points by the third year. Journal of Comparative Economics xxx (xx) (2011) xxx–xxx. The
University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland 1142, New Zealand; Arizona State
University, PO Box 879801, Tempe, AZ 85287-9801, USA; Macedonian Academy of Sciences
and Arts, Bul. Krste Misirkov, 2, 1000 Skopje, Republic of Macedonia; FEASS, Bilkent Univer-
sity, Ankara 06800, Turkey.
 2011 Association for Comparative Economic Studies Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.1. Introduction
One of the more troubling aspects of the economic transition in Eastern Europe has been that the growth of aggregate
output since the early to mid-1990s has been accompanied by stagnant or declining employment, particularly in South East
Europe. This has resulted in gains in wages, clearly a desirable result, but in some countries it has also resulted in high levels
of unemployment or underemployment, creating a phenomenon that some observers have called ‘‘jobless growth’’.1 The lack
of job growth, particularly in the SEE countries has contributed to a variety of social and political problems, and dealing with
them has been a serious policy concern, both in the countries of the region and among foreign assistance donors. One of, if not
the, worst performing transition countries in terms of unemployment has been the Republic of Macedonia, whose registered
unemployment rate over the past 20 year period peaked above 40% and remains in the low- to mid-30 percent rate to thisfor Comparative Economic Studies Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
ity, PO Box 879801, Tempe, AZ 85287-9801, USA. Fax: +1 480 965 6524.
labor market issues see, Svejnar (2002a,b). Brown and Earle (2008) examine this phenomenon from the
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ment and employment rates’’ in large part due to the fact that it ‘‘shows very little capacity of job creation’’ (p. 6).
Given Macedonia’s poor labor market performance, foreign aid donors have focused much of their assistance to the
country on job creation programs. Moreover, given the lack of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) at the start
of transition and the widely-held perception that SMEs have the potential to create jobs rapidly and in large numbers,
much of that assistance has been directed at SMEs. In this paper we examine the effectiveness of a set of programs devel-
oped by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide mainly technical assistance, but also
ﬁnancial assistance, to Macedonian ﬁrms in order to improve their performance and particularly to increase the number of
jobs that they provide. The technical assistance programs provided business and technical knowledge and skills to
Macedonian entrepreneurs through training, seminars, demonstrations and consulting. We employ survey data collected
from Macedonian ﬁrms that had participated in USAID program as well as from ﬁrms that had not, and we estimate the
effects of USAID assistance on job creation in recipient ﬁrms using matching techniques that compare their performance to
a sample of ﬁrms that did not receive assistance. We ﬁnd that USAID assistance had a positive and signiﬁcant effect, in
both the statistical and in the economic senses, on full-time and total employment in Macedonian ﬁrms that participated
in USAID programs.
In the next section of the paper we selectively review the literature on the effectiveness of technical and ﬁnancial assis-
tance to ﬁrms in market economies as well as the more limited literature on the effectiveness of assistance to ﬁrms in tran-
sition economies. Section 3 describes the data used in this study as well as the surveys used to obtain the data. Section 4
explains the matching techniques we use to estimate the effectiveness of USAID programs in Macedonia, and Section 5 pre-
sents the results of our estimates of job creation due to the assistance that ﬁrms received, compares themwith other relevant
studies and draws out the policy implications. Section 6 concludes and suggests avenues for further research.2. Barriers to ﬁrm growth
Research on the barriers to the growth of SMEs in transition economies was initially directed toward identifying the most
important changes in the business and regulatory environment of transition economies so as to promote SME formation, sur-
vival and growth. Johnson et al. (2000) studied ﬁrms in ﬁve transition economies and concluded that the main barrier to SME
growth lay much more in unclear property rights than in lack of access to bank credit. Pissarides et al. (2003), on the other
hand, concluded, based on their analysis of Bulgarian and Russian managers’ perceptions, that lack of ﬁnance was a much
greater barrier than were unclear property rights. While such studies may have been useful in guiding policy makers in these
countries in shaping their reform agendas, they do have a number of shortcomings as guides to formulating programs to as-
sist SMEs in the region now. In part this is due to the fact that the data from which these conclusions are drawn are now
rather dated, with the former study based on 1994–1996 data and the latter on surveys administered in 1995. Clearly, there
has been tremendous, although varying by country, progress in both the development of the ﬁnancial sector and in the
strengthening of property rights and the rule of law in many transition countries, and thus the barriers that were important
in the early stages of the transition are not necessarily the ones that need to be addressed now. Moreover, these studies did
not attempt any evaluation of the effectiveness of assistance to SMEs in overcoming the obstacles to growth, and thus they
are of limited use in framing current and future assistance programs. Finally, Commander and Svejnar (in press) show that
the effect of these and other perceived barriers to growth is hard to demonstrate when the barriers are introduced jointly or
when country ﬁxed effects are accounted for.
More relevant for the evaluation anddesign of assistance programs for SMEs in transition economies are two studies, Brown
et al. (2005) and Brown and Earle (2009), that examine the effectiveness of ﬁnancial assistance programs for Romanian SMEs.
The ﬁrst of these is a study that, like ours, is based in part on a survey of ﬁrms, but it includes only ﬁrms that participated in
assistanceprograms, imposinga signiﬁcant econometricburden to account for the ‘‘counterfactual’’ of theperformanceofﬁrms
that did not participate in such programs. Besides beingmore recent than the previouslymentioned studies because their sur-
veyswere undertaken in 2000, Brown et al. (2005)were able to cover a longer time period from the time of the ﬁrm’s founding
to the time of the survey. In a follow-up paper, Brown and Earle (2009) added Romanian ﬁrms that did not participate in the
assistance programs to their sample, and thus they were able to use matching methods to better estimate the effects of assis-
tance. Both papers conclude that ﬁnancial assistance did have a positive and signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrm growth, but technical
assistance, although valued by recipients, had no signiﬁcant effect on job creation in the recipient ﬁrms.3
While the evidence from transition economies of the effectiveness of assistance to SME’s is thus limited to this paper and
the two studies just discussed, there is large body of research on the effectiveness of both ﬁnancial and technical assistance
to SMEs in market economies, and we brieﬂy and selectively review this literature to put our ﬁndings and methodology into
a broader perspective. We begin by noting that many countries and regional governments fund and operate assistance2 The high registered unemployment rate is partly due to the linking of health beneﬁts to an individual’s status as either working or registered unemployed.
Labor force survey data report unemployment rates that are on average about 10 percentage points lower, still a high level by international standards.
3 The authors report some positive effects of technical assistance in some of their regression results, but not in the majority of their speciﬁcations and not in
those estimates that appear most reliable from an econometric standpoint.
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both output and employment.4
A second reason for the existence of programs to assist SMEs is that proponents of such programs contend that SME’s are
burdened by market and information failures to a greater degree than are large ﬁrms. For example, programs to provide sub-
sidized loans to SMEs or to help them apply for commercial credit can be found in many countries. The rationale for such
programs includes high interest rates charged to SMEs by ﬁnancial institutions, in part due to poorer ﬁnancial and business
information that SMEs are able to provide; higher risk premia for SMEs; the reluctance of ﬁnancial institutions to cover the
administrative costs of small loans; the lack of longer-term credits to SMEs, etc. Studies demonstrating the effectiveness of
loan supports in improving SME formation, employment growth and/or ﬁrm survival can be found, for example, for pro-
grams implemented in the US (Brash and Gallagher, 2008), Germany (Almus, 2001), New Zealand (Ministry of Economic
Development of New Zealand, 2009), and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Hart and Gudgin, 1999; Roper
and Hewitt-Dundas, 2001). There are, as well, studies that fail to ﬁnd evidence of the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial assistance for SMEs,
for example in Mexico (World Bank, 2007). The conﬂicting evidence on the effectiveness or lack thereof of these programs
may reﬂect the conceptual difﬁculties of separating the effect of assistance from other factors that inﬂuence ﬁrm perfor-
mance or cross-country differences in the effectiveness of these programs due to the way in which they are designed, admin-
istered and funded.
Many countries and regional governments also provide technical assistance to SMEs for much the same reasons they pro-
vide ﬁnancial assistance: to support SME growth and to overcome market imperfections. One such barrier to SME growth
and survival that many programs attempt to address is lack of managerial, business and technical expertise. That the lack
of such expertise is an important barrier to SME success is demonstrated by Westhead (1995), who allocated a sample of
UK ﬁrms into four clusters, one characterized as having founders who were ‘‘managerially sophisticated’’, two with founders
characterized as being ‘‘technologically qualiﬁed’’, and one having inexperienced founders with limited technological net-
works. Although his sample size precluded strong statistical inferences, the documented performance of ﬁrms in the four
clusters clearly suggests that, as one would expect, lack of managerial skills combined with a lack of access to technological
networks was a major barrier to the success of SMEs.
It is to be expected that entrepreneurs in transition economies are likely to be lacking in business and technical skills to a
greater degree than are their market-economy counterparts. Moreover, managers of SMEs who lack such managerial and
technological skills are unlikely to purchase them from outside sources because they fail to understand the potential beneﬁts
of doing so, because they are reluctant to share control and information with outsiders, and because day-to-day issues of
running the business limit the time available for formulating growth strategies and acquiring new business and technical
skills (Ministry of Economic Development of New Zealand, 2009; Chrisman and McMullan, 2004). In transition economies,
such consultancy services are also likely to be both underappreciated and in short supply.
SMEs also tend to underinvest in R&D, and the resulting lack of technical capabilities hampers their ability to adopt new
process technology and thus to grow. Lerner (1999) provides evidence that support for improvements in SMEs’ technological
capabilities improves the performance of US MNCs, and Meriküll (2010) ﬁnds similar evidence for Estonian ﬁrms. In contrast
to Brown and Earle’s (2009) ﬁnding of ineffectiveness of non-ﬁnancial assistance to Romanian SMEs, the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Development of New Zealand (2009) ﬁnds that programs to provide consultancy and business skills to New Zealand
SMEs are effective in improving their growth and survival, as do Wren and Storey (2002) for UK SMEs. A ﬁnding that tech-
nical assistance does improve ﬁrm performance has important policy signiﬁcance because technical advice provided through
seminars, training sessions and instructional materials is more in the nature of a public good in that more ﬁrms can receive
this kind of assistance at low or zero marginal cost, while the reach of ﬁnancial assistance is constrained to the funds allo-
cated for the program.
Based on the foregoing evidence, ﬁrms in developed market economies seem to beneﬁt from programs that provide ﬁnan-
cial and technical assistance. Whether ﬁrms in Macedonia can beneﬁt from similar programs depends in part on whether
such programs address the obstacles to growth that they face by virtue of their transition-economy environment. In the sur-
vey of Macedonian mangers that we conducted and that we describe below, we asked respondents to rate the importance of
a number of factors considered likely barriers to ﬁrm growth in transition economies. Managers were asked to rank these on
a scale of zero, meaning not a barrier to growth to two, meaning a serious barrier to growth. Results are reported in Table 1.
Quite clearly Macedonia’s status as a transition economy seems to pose formidable barriers to the survival and growth of
ﬁrms. The ﬁrst four items in Table 1 relate to the government’s ability to enforce the rule of law and provide secure property
rights. Competition from the black market and from unregistered ﬁrms, which have a competitive advantage because they
avoid paying taxes and conforming to safety, phytosanitary and labor regulations, is by far the most serious barrier to their
ﬁrm’s growth reported by Macedonian mangers. Legal disputes, mainly having to do with disputes over the ownership of
ﬁrms, and high taxes are also seen as important barriers to growth.
The other items in Table 1 have to do with the availability of inputs. Obtaining a business premises and purchasing
needed material inputs on the market are not major barriers to ﬁrms’ growth. The supply of labor also does not appear to
be a problem for ﬁrms, a ﬁnding consistent with the high rate of unemployment. However about one-third of the ﬁrms
do report that the lack of skilled managers is a serious barrier to their growth, and 19% report it to be a moderate barrier.4 For a discussion of the evidence that SME’s contribute to employment growth in transition economies, see Brown and Earle (2008).
Table 1
Barriers to ﬁrm growth as reported by Macedonian managers.
Barrier to growth (% of total observations)
Competition from black market and unregistered ﬁrms 0 (not a barrier) 20.5
1 (moderate barrier) 15.0
2 (serious barrier) 62.0
Legal disputes 0 (not a barrier) 38.5
1 (moderate barrier) 21.1
2 (serious barrier) 36.2
Business 0 (not a barrier) 42.7
Environment and regulations 1 (moderate barrier) 30.9
2 (serious barrier) 25.2
Taxes 0 (not a barrier) 32.5
1 (moderate barrier) 27.1
2 (serious barrier) 38.5
Acquiring a business premises 0 (not a barrier) 56.1
1 (moderate barrier) 23.6
2 (serious barrier) 19.2
Access to external ﬁnance 0 (not a barrier) 32.6
1 (moderate barrier) 22.0
2 (serious barrier) 43.6
Availability of inputs on the market 0 (not a barrier) 50.9
1 (moderate barrier) 29.7
2 (serious barrier) 18.5
Availability of internal ﬁnance 0 (not a barrier) 35.8
1 (moderate barrier) 25.6
2 (serious barrier) 36.5
Availability of appropriate labor 0 (not a barrier) 46.0
1 (moderate barrier) 25.0
2 (serious barrier) 27.6
Availability of managers with needed skills 0 (not a barrier) 42.5
1 (moderate barrier) 19.0
2 (serious barrier) 31.6
Notes: This table reports the frequencies for responses of 0, 1, 2. The total may not add to 100% due to missing responses. Because we have panel data, an
observation is a ﬁrm’s response for each year for which the ﬁrm evaluated barriers to growth. Thus ﬁrms may have responded for several years, and their
responses may have differed from 1 year to the next.
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ﬁrms. About 44% of managers report that lack of access to external ﬁnance is a serious barrier to their ﬁrm’s growth and
another 22% rate is as a moderate barrier. The lack of internally generated funds for expansion is also rated as an important
barrier by over one-third of the ﬁrms. These responses suggest that Macedonian ﬁrms’ growth does appear to be constrained
by a lack of ﬁnancing, and programs designed to improve their access to credit, either by providing ﬁnancial support or
through programs that improve managers’ skills in applying for loans, should have a positive effect on their growth as well.
Thus it is reasonable to expect that programs that provide business and technical skills to SME managers in Macedonia, as
well as programs that improved their access to external ﬁnance, if well-conceived and effectively delivered, should have
some positive impact on SMEs’ job creation.3. Data
3.1. Firm-level surveys
In an ideal environment, the effectiveness of a policy intervention at the ﬁrm level could be estimated using a random
sample of ﬁrms, with information covering periods before, after, and during the phase of policy intervention. If participation
in the program is not random, then steps must be taken to account for the possibility of selection bias. Such selection bias can
arise if ﬁrms are chosen by program organizers in a way that favors participation by ﬁrms more likely to beneﬁt from the
program or that have good growth prospects relative to other ﬁrms because of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. Alternatively,
ﬁrms with better growth prospects may self-select to participate in the program.5 If a random sample of ﬁrms is not available,
then there should some effort to match the ﬁrms receiving assistance and those not receiving assistance in terms of major5 In the case of assistance programs for SMEs, such selection bias is desirable in that scarce program resources should be directed toward ﬁrms that have the
greatest potential to make effective use of them. Roper and Hewitt-Dundas (2001), for example, criticize some of the assistance programs they evaluate for their
inability to discriminate between ﬁrms that are likely to beneﬁt from assistance and those that are not.
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trolled for in the speciﬁcation of the model. Unfortunately, there was no systematic collection of data on the performance
of Macedonian ﬁrms either before or after they participated in USAID programs, and this data, as well as data on the perfor-
mance of ﬁrms that did not participate in USAID programs had to be obtained ex post through ﬁeld surveys.6
The survey consisted of a questionnaire administered in face-to-face interviews of about 1 h with ﬁrm mangers, con-
ducted in Macedonian.7 The survey asked for a count of employees rather than the ﬁrm’s wage bill because it was deemed un-
likely that a sufﬁciently large number of respondents would be able to recall the history of their wage bill in sufﬁcient detail,
and that requiring wage-bill information would introduce a bias toward larger and more successful ﬁrms. We did, however,
seek to obtain information on both full-time and part-time employment in order to investigate whether there was a differential
effect of assistance on employment growth or whether part-time employees were cannibalizing the jobs of full-time workers.8
Also on the survey were questions about ﬁrm characteristics and the respondents’ subjective perceptions of barriers to the
growth of their ﬁrm. Respondents also indicated whether they had participated in programs to provide technical or ﬁnancial
assistance from USAID and other programs and the year(s) in which such support had been received.
The survey was administered by a Macedonian market research ﬁrm. The objective was to obtain a sample of 100 ﬁrms
that had participated in USAID assistance programs and a control group of 100 ﬁrms not known to have received assistance,
matched for location and, where possible, for business sector. We identiﬁed potential respondent ﬁrms that had received
USAID assistance by reviewing publicly available sources of information on USAID activities, by obtaining names directly
from the USAID ofﬁce in Macedonia and from the USAID contractors and implementers who had run assistance projects
in Macedonia. We also used information from USAID’s TraiNet database. Because some of our contact data were over a dec-
ade old, we identiﬁed about 400 ﬁrms that may have received USAID assistance. Ideally, this sample would have mirrored
the mix of USAID funding for the two main types of assistance programs sponsored by USAID: technical assistance to ﬁrms
and ﬁnancial assistance. In fact, the number of recipients of ﬁnancial assistance we were able to obtain from contractors and
implementers fell short of this as we detail below. Thus, we included in our potential sample every recipient of ﬁnancial
assistance we were able to identify and then sampled randomly from the remaining list of 400 ﬁrms until 100 ﬁrms had been
surveyed. This yielded a list of 14 ﬁrms that had received ﬁnancial assistance and 86 that had received technical assistance.
The Macedonian survey ﬁrm, upon receiving the list of 400 ﬁrms, analyzed it by sector and geographic region and produced a
sample of companies not known to have received USAID assistance with a similar sectoral and regional distribution as our
assisted sample, thus to some extent controlling for location and sector effects. The survey was administered from July to
August 2007. Among the ﬁrms on our list that could be located, the response rate was 70%.3.2. Descriptive statistics
Our data set is an unbalanced panel. The estimation method used in this paper exploits the panel dimension to decrease
the effect of selection bias on our estimates of program effectiveness. While our initial survey covered 200 ﬁrms for the per-
iod 1992–2007, the ﬁnal number of treated ﬁrms used in the estimation is smaller. First, of the 100 treated ﬁrms surveyed,
10 did not recall receiving USAID assistance.9 The remaining 90 treated ﬁrms were further reduced in number by eliminating
ﬁve ﬁrms that failed to identify assistance dates; three ﬁrms that gave inconsistent dates for USAID assistance (aid reported in
a year before the ﬁrm was founded); two ﬁrms that were founded in 2007, which means that there was no data with which
to calculate post-assistance employment growth; and eight ﬁrms that received assistance in the year they were formed,
which prevents us from calculating employment growth in the assistance year. We also dropped three ﬁrms that had re-
ceived USAID assistance prior to 1996 because the early 1990s were characterized by chaotic economic conditions and
extensive ﬁrm restructuring.
Of the 69 remaining treated ﬁrms, a further 11 had to be dropped from the sample because of incomplete data, leaving a
total of 58 treated ﬁrms for estimation purposes.10 Thirty-four ﬁrms received only technical assistance, three ﬁrms received
only ﬁnancial assistance, and the remainder received both types of assistance. Of the ﬁrms receiving both types of assistance,
ten received technical assistance before receiving ﬁnancial assistance, ﬁve received ﬁnancial assistance ﬁrst, and six received
ﬁnancial and technical assistance in the same year. If a ﬁrm received USAID assistance in year t and then USAID or other
government assistance again in a subsequent year, say, t + n, we only estimated the treatment effect for the ﬁrst instance of6 A shortcoming of such a retrospective approach is that ﬁrms that have not survived until the time that the sampling took place cannot be included in the
study thus overestimating the effectiveness of assistance. On the other hand, if USAID programs have some positive effect on ﬁrm survival rates, this effect
cannot be measured, suggesting possible underestimation of overall program effectiveness. Some researchers take the inability to locate ﬁrms as evidence of
ﬁrm failure; given the incomplete record keeping on assisted ﬁrms in Macedonia, this was not an option in this study.
7 An English-language version of the survey is available from the authors upon request.
8 The lack of part-time job opportunities appears is an important barrier to the ability of new and young workers to gain labor market experience. Lehmann
(2010) reports that part-time work is common only in agriculture in Macedonia.
9 In part this was due to the fact that respondents tended to associate the assistance program in which they participated with the contractor running the
program rather than with USAID, the sponsor. In some cases, if respondents were prompted with the name of the contractor, they did recall receiving
assistance.
10 Often this involved missing data on the pre-assistance year characteristics. We tested whether the ﬁrms with missing data differed from the 58 remaining
ﬁrms. Aside from employment, the only other continuous variable is age. There is no signiﬁcant employment or age difference between deleted and remaining
ﬁrms. For the discrete variables, there is no signiﬁcant difference between the two groups of ﬁrms either.
Table 2
Distribution of observations by year.
Year Firms receiving
No assistance USAID assistance Total
1996 37 4 41
1997 42 0 42
1998 47 1 48
1999 53 0 53
2000 57 1 58
2001 64 5 69
2002 65 4 69
2003 68 13 81
2004 74 9 83
2005 81 12 93
2006 87 9 96
2007 89 0 89
Total 764 58 822
Notes: An assisted ﬁrm is counted only once in the assistance year but has
employment data at least 2, and up to 5, years. Non-assisted ﬁrms can be
counted more than once. In a given year, we count all non-assisted ﬁrms that
existed in the prior year if they have employment data for at least 2 years.
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tance obtained. The reason for this is that if we were also to estimate the treatment effect for the second instance of assistance,
whether ﬁnancial or technical, the estimate of the effect of the second treatment could be biased upward to the extent that
there are longer-term effects of the ﬁrst treatment on employment growth that carry over to the years over which the effect
of the second treatment is estimated. The six ﬁrms that received ﬁnancial and technical assistance in the same year were
not placed in either category, but they were retained in the sample, and we present some results on the complemantarity of
ﬁnancial and technical assistance based on the limited experience of these six ﬁrms below.
After these deletions, 822 observations remained. An observation is a combination of a ﬁrm and its annual data for a given
year because we have panel data. For ﬁrms that received assistance, there is one observation, which contains information on
the year before assistance, another observation for the year in which assistance is received and then observations for up to
3 years after the receipt of assistance. Firms that did not receive assistance may have more than one observation with infor-
mation of at least 2 years and a maximum of 4 years. For example, if a non-assisted ﬁrm (i) is created in 2000, then we have
observations i-year from 2001 to 2007. Each i-year observation has characteristics before and after that year. Table 2 shows
the yearly distribution of ﬁrms that received assistance in a given year as well as of unassisted ﬁrms that were potential
matches. Most USAID assistance was provided between 2001 and 2006.Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Total Assisted Not assisted
Obs. Mean Mean Mean
Panel A: Continuous variables
Full-time employment 822 13.27 47.00 10.71
(45.20) (129.30) (29.26)
Total employment 822 13.41 47.91 10.80
(45.21) (129.22) (29.24)
Age 822 8.98 9.69 8.92
(8.30) (10.55) (8.11)
Change in total employment in year t 822 0.04 0.07 0.03
(0.27) (0.29) (0.27)
Change in total employment in year t + 1 730 0.07 0.17 0.06
(0.41) (0.78) (0.36)
Change in total employment in year t + 2 630 0.10 0.25 0.09
(0.50) (0.93) (0.45)
Change in total employment in year t + 3 534 0.14 0.35 0.12
(0.53) (0.71) (0.52)
Panel B: Dichotomous (0–1) variables
Obs. % of obs. value = 1 % of obs. value = 1 % of obs. value = 1
Sector = industry 822 6.00 3.45 6.15
Sector = services 822 49.27 39.66 50.00
At least one employee has a university degree 822 57.54 77.59 56.02
Owner has a university degree 822 67.60 82.46 66.49
Exports > 50% output 822 21.65 34.48 20.68
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tinuous variables. We report both full-time and total employment, although the difference is quite small, reﬂecting the lack
of part-time jobs in Macedonia. The average ﬁrm in the sample has 13 employees with a large standard deviation of 45. The
majority of the ﬁrms, 77.6%, were small with less than 10 employees, 19% were medium-sized with between 10 and 50
employees and only 3.4% had more than 50 employees, the largest having 800 employees. As is to be expected, the age dis-
tribution is skewed toward young ﬁrms with 51% being less than 8 years old. The average age is 9 years with a standard devi-
ation of 8.3 years.11 We also report the average total employment growth for the assistance year and for 1–3 years after the
assistance year. Employment grows over time for assisted and unassisted ﬁrms, but the former exhibit higher rates of
growth.
Panel B reports the summary statistics for discrete variables. Firms classiﬁed in the services sector represent almost 50%
of all observations, and manufacturing ﬁrms account for only 6%.12 Most ﬁrms’ managers, 67.6%, have a higher education and
57.5% of ﬁrms report employees who also have a higher education. Firms that export more than 50% of their production account
for 21.7% of the sample.13
Table 3 also shows the differences between ﬁrms that received assistance and those that did not. The average employ-
ment in USAID assistance recipients is more than four times that of ﬁrms in the control group, although this is due to the
presence of two large ﬁrms in the assisted group.14 The age difference between assisted and unassisted ﬁrms is less than
1 year, but the employment growth rates show large differences for all periods after assistance and the corresponding years
in unassisted ﬁrms. There are also differences between assisted and unassisted ﬁrms in terms of the discrete variables; the for-
mer have better-educated managers and workers and more of them tend to export a large share of their output. While 3.45% of
ﬁrms that received assistance are in industry, the corresponding share is 6.15% for the control group, which also has a higher
share of ﬁrms in agriculture and agro-industry. For the propensity score estimation described below, we include the above vari-
ables and the variables related to ﬁrms’ responses about the barriers to growth described in Table 1. Because the variable related
to taxes as a barrier to growth had many missing observations, we did not include it in the propensity score estimation
described below.3.3. Sample size
Most studies of treatment effects on ﬁrms use a large number of controls or untreated ﬁrms relative to the number of
treated ﬁrms. This is often facilitated by the availability of government censuses of ﬁrms, which provide easy access to
accounting data on all ﬁrms in a country. The reason for using a large number of untreated ﬁrms is that this increases
the chances of ﬁnding one or several untreated ﬁrms that are very similar to a treated ﬁrm, thus facilitating the estimation
of the treatment effect on the treated ‘‘twin’’. Our study has, by the standards of these studies, a modest number of untreated
ﬁrms, as Table 2 shows, so the question of sample size needs to be addressed.
The power of any matching test depends on two factors, the existence of good untreated ‘‘twins’’ or controls for the trea-
ted ﬁrms and sample size. A large sample of untreated ﬁrms increases the likelihood that we can ﬁnd one or more untreated
ﬁrms that are very similar, if not identical, to each of the treated ﬁrms. However, the innate similarity between the ﬁrms in
the treated and untreated sample also has to be considered. If all ﬁrms in the economy are very similar to each other, then
the probability of ﬁnding a match between a treated and untreated ﬁrm can still be high even if the sample of untreated
ﬁrms is small. This is point is most evident when matching techniques are used in psychology or medicine rather than in
economics. Researchers in those disciplines sometimes use identical twins in studies of treatment effects.15 Note that in such11 For an assisted ﬁrm, the baseline year is the year before the year in which assistance is received. So ‘‘age’’ is the number of years the ﬁrm was in existence
prior to the year in which it received assistance, and employment growth is then measured for employment for year t (the year in which assistance was
received), year t + 1, the year after assistance was received, etc. So if we measure the effect of assistance for years t, t + 1, t + 2 and t + 3, then we have to have at
least three and at most 5 years of employment data for each ﬁrm treated in year t and for the ﬁrms that are used as (potential) controls for this ﬁrm. For non-
assisted ﬁrms used as controls in a given year between 1996 and 2006, the age is also measured for the year before the year in which the treated ﬁrms that are
matched to the untreated ﬁrms received their assistance, and the employment growth rates are calculated for exactly the same years as those of the treated
ﬁrms. Matching on a year by year basis controls for time-varying unobserved variables that may also inﬂuence employment growth.
12 The default group is agriculture and the processing of agricultural products. This ‘‘deﬁcit’’ of SMEs in manufacturing is characteristic of transition economies
(Bartelsman et al., 2004).
13 This may seem a surprisingly high proportion of ﬁrms with such a high level of exports, but it may accurately reﬂect Macedonia’s relatively small domestic
market, geography, and export structure. Many of the ﬁrms in our sample that export a large share of their production are ﬁrms engaged in agricultural
processing. The south-eastern part of Macedonia, centered on the city of Gevgelia, enjoys a Mediterranean climate and engages in the growing of fruits and
vegetables, especially in greenhouses, which permits a very long growing season. This part of Macedonia also borders Greece and is quite close to Thessaloniki,
which is major population center in the region. Thus, agricultural production from this part of Macedonia is ‘‘processed’’ (which for agriculture may mean such
simple activities as sorting, washing and packing) by small ﬁrms who then sell this produce directly in markets in adjacent Greece or to Greek wholesalers and
retailers, especially to those in Thessaloniki where prices and incomes are higher than in Macedonia. A second group of small ﬁrms that engage in intensive
export activity is to be found in the city of Tetovo, which is a center for textile and shoe manufacture. Most of the ﬁrms in Tetovo engage in what is called
‘‘lohnarbeit’’, the production of shoes and clothing on order for foreign department stores and retail chains. The foreigner supplies the material and designs, and
the Macedonian ﬁrm then produces the required quantity of ﬁnished product and exports it. As this is a long-established business in Tetovo, even SMEs have
the foreign contacts and skills necessary to participate in this form of subcontracting, which implies that the majority of their output is exported.
14 The two largest ﬁrms in the sample received USAID assistance. If we drop these two ﬁrms from our sample, then the ratio of employment in assisted ﬁrms
to employment in unassisted ﬁrms drops to about 2–1.
15 See van Belle et al. (2004) for example.
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characteristics ensures that each treated subject has a very close if not identical match.16 The more general implication then is
that the adequacy of the number of controls available for achieving ‘‘good’’ matches is an empirical issue that depends on the
similarly of the treated and untreated subjects in terms of the relevant covariates, a point made by Gauderman (2002) in a re-
lated context.
We note that our sample of ﬁrms is drawn from a small middle-income economy of about 2 million people that produces
a relatively limited assortment of goods and services, and the ﬁrms interviewed were located in Macedonia’s few major cit-
ies. Moreover, because this is a transition economy, these ﬁrms all came into existence at about the same time, after 1990 but
before 2007, and thus they have very similar histories. As a result, the ﬁrms in our sample should be rather more homoge-
nous than a sample of ﬁrms drawn from larger, more advanced and more economically diverse countries such as the UK or
Germany, and the likelihood of ﬁnding comparable ﬁrms in our smaller control sample is consequently higher. We acknowl-
edge that the studies we cite do use a larger sample of ﬁrms, but this larger number is often the result of researchers having
access to extensive ﬁrm-level data from government surveys or censuses rather than being based on any objective statistical
basis. Thus it is not clear that these studies establish a valid lower limit on sample size.
Further support for the belief that our sample of untreated ﬁrms yields sufﬁcient matches for the treated ﬁrms comes
from the fact that the two matching methods, caliper and kernel, that we use yield asymptotically identical results as the
size of the control sample increases. Since in our case the two methods yield relatively similar treatment estimates, this
can be taken as a sign that our control group size is sufﬁciently large given the degree of ﬁrm homogeneity in our sample.
Finally, as part of our robustness tests, we examine whether changes in the value of the caliper change the number of accept-
able matches, and, as reported below, we ﬁnd that the number of matches between treated and untreated ﬁrms does not
change with the value of the caliper, suggesting that the matches we do have are close ones and that the treated ﬁrms that
do not have good counterparts among the untreated ﬁrms are well identiﬁed and excluded from the calculation of the
treatment effect.4. Methodology
To evaluate the employment generation impact of USAID programs we use a treatment effects methodology because we
wish to account for the possibility of selectivity bias in USAID programs and to better distinguish the counterfactual of how
employment in assisted ﬁrms would have grown in the absence of their participation in USAID programs. Selectivity bias
may arise from two sources. First, USAID and its contractors may have chosen more productive and better-managed ﬁrms
to participate in assistance programs, and these characteristics thus account for some or all of the seemingly better post-
assistance performance of these ﬁrms. The other source of bias is self-selection, whereby ﬁrms with better technology, better
educated and more able managers, and better growth prospects would select themselves into the program. Thus, some of the
post-participation increase in employment in those ﬁrms could, as well, be due to these characteristics rather than to the
effectiveness of the assistance program.17 We use propensity score matching to minimize the effect of such biases on our
results.18
There are three steps to our methodology, (i) the estimation of the propensity score and, subsequently, (ii) the matching
of the treated ﬁrms and controls with the same estimated propensity score, and ﬁnally (iii) calculating the effect of treatment
on employment change for each value of the estimated propensity score and averaging them to obtain ATT.
4.1. Estimating the propensity score
The ﬁrst step is to estimate a logit model to determine the propensity score. For assisted ﬁrms, data in the year before
assistance is used while for non-assisted ﬁrms, all observations are used.19 An issue in this step is what variables to include
in the logit estimation. No algorithm exists for this choice, but one should choose variables that inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s partic-
ipation in the program and the program’s effect on the ﬁrm.20 Economic theory and the nature of the data set can also guide
this process. Most studies of ﬁrm responses to assistance use the ﬁrm’s age and size, often measured by employment, as
explanatory variables. Larger and more established ﬁrms may be better positioned to beneﬁt from assistance and they
may also be able to spare the time and resources needed for participation in assistance programs. In the case of Macedonia,16 Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) is a rare example of the use of identical twins for matching purposes in economics.
17 Chemin (2008) uses a matching methodology similar to that used in this paper to demonstrate that accounting for such biases signiﬁcantly reduces the
estimated effects of microﬁnance programs in Bangladesh.
18 See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a description of propensity score matching.
19 The difference between this and the usual propensity score estimation is that our data a ﬁrm can participate at any time. Therefore for non-participants all
observations have to be used.
20 There is disagreement in the literature over the inclusion of variables when specifying the propensity scoring equation. Shadish et al. (2002, pp. 162–163)
suggest that as many valid variables as possible (including interaction terms) should be included even if they are not statistically signiﬁcant. Of the studies we
have reviewed, only Almus (2001) appears to take this advice seriously by employing a battery of non-linear and interaction terms; other studies we cite appear
to opt for a more parsimonious speciﬁcation. Such parsimony also has clear support in the literature. For example, Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008, pp.38–39)
warn against ‘‘overparametrized’’ propensity scoring models, and suggest a speciﬁcation strategy that involves starting with a few basic variables such as age
and some regional dummies and then iteratively adding other variables, which are retained only if they prove statistically signiﬁcant ‘‘at conventional levels’’.
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variety of contracts to providers of assistance in Macedonia. Aid to ﬁrms included the establishment of business centers that
helped ﬁrms with ﬁnancial management, planning, product development and marketing. Other programs were shorter term
in nature, and their names, such as the Entrepreneurial Management and Executive Development Program, the Macedonia
Competitiveness Activity and the Strategic Technical Assistance for Results with Training (START), suggest that they often
provided training through seminars and other short-term interventions. Thus, much of the participation in these technical
assistance programs was driven by the decision of Macedonian managers to participate rather than on the basis of selections
for participation by program organizers.
Consequently, we use the survey information on Macedonian managers’ perceptions of the barriers to their ﬁrms’ growth
in our speciﬁcation. If USAID seminars could provide information or training that Macedonian managers perceived as helpful
in stimulating the growth of their ﬁrms, they would be more likely to attend, and if the information was useful and relevant,
their ﬁrms would subsequently experience above average growth. The use of such ‘‘subjective’’ data as managers’ opinions,
as opposed to ‘‘objective’’ quantitative data on ﬁrms’ characteristics, makes this study somewhat unique. Many studies use
(often government-provided) accounting data on ﬁrms to calculate the propensity scores because these are the only data
available, not because there is evidence that they are better than ‘‘subjective’’ data in predicting program participation. Thus,
a potential strength of this study is that our surveys do provide subjective data on managers’ perceptions of barriers to their
ﬁrm’s growth. If managers subjectively feel that their ﬁrm is held back by lack of management skills, they are more likely to
participate in aid programs that develop such skills; managers who ﬁnd it difﬁcult to ﬁnd suitable workers may participate in
seminars that teach them about new technology that may substitute for such workers (e.g., information technology as a sub-
stitute for accountants), etc. If such subjective data were less useful in predicting program participation than are accounting
data, our propensity scoring estimates would be less likely to satisfy the balancing tests, and the ‘‘subjective’’ variables’ coef-
ﬁcients would not be statistically signiﬁcant.4.2. Matching assisted and unassisted ﬁrms
In the second stage, because it is unlikely that we can ﬁnd two ﬁrms with exactly the same propensity score, we con-
sider two commonly used matching methods, nearest- neighbor matching with caliper and kernel matching.21 The near-
est-neighbor method matches each treated unit to its nearest neighbor with or without replacement. In the case of nearest-
neighbor matching with replacement, if the nearest control unit has already been used, it can be used again. This increases
the average quality of the matches, but it can lead to lower variance for the estimated ATT. The use of a caliper reduces the
risk of bad matches if the closest neighbor is far away by imposing a tolerance level on the maximum propensity score dis-
tance, the caliper. A small caliper will impose the common support condition. Imposing this condition will decrease the num-
ber of observations as those treated–untreated ﬁrms pairs that do not satisfy this condition are not used to estimate the
treatment effect. We impose this condition and do not use replacement in our implementation of the methodology. In kernel
matching, every treated unit is matched with a weighted average of all control units with weights that are inversely propor-
tional to the distance between their scores and that of the treated unit. A small bandwidth for the kernel will lead to the
imposition of a common support. We use the default bandwidth of 0.05. In general, kernel matching is preferred to the cal-
iper because the former uses more information from the data. However, for small samples, caliper matching may be more
appropriate because it puts no weight on outlier non-treated ﬁrms, which may become a problem for kernel matching if
there are many outliers in a small sample of untreated ﬁrms.
In the matching process, we match each ﬁrm that received USAID assistance to ﬁrms in the same pretreatment year as in
Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Todo (2008).22 This is crucial for our data set because ﬁrms are born within the sample period
and USAID assistance occurs at different dates. Heckman et al. (1997) argue that geographic mismatches should be avoided
in the context of job market evaluation programs. For our sample this amounts to avoiding period mismatches. With this
approach, we insulate our ATT measures from time effects and endogeneity issues caused by having been selected for treat-
ment in different years.
With either matching method we ensure that the balancing property is satisﬁed. In other words, the treated and control
groups have the same characteristics after the matching process. We use four balancing tests as in Sianesi (2004). The ﬁrst is
sample t-tests that compare the covariates means of the treated and control groups before and after matching. Given that our
matching is by period, the subsamples for the t-tests are from observations from corresponding periods. The second is a
Hotelling T-squared test that tests the joint equality of means between the two groups for all covariates. In addition, we
perform a pseudo R-squared test and a likelihood ratio (LR) test. These two tests evaluate the explanatory power of the
covariates after matching using probit or logit estimation as before the matching. A successful matching should lead to
low pseudo R-squared, and the estimated coefﬁcients of the probit should be close to zero.21 Another alternative is so-called synthetic matching as described by Abadie et al. (2010). This technique, however, requires the data on all ﬁrms treated in a
given year to be averaged into a single observation. Such consolidation of observations destroys the information provided by individual ﬁrm data, and thus we
do not use it in this paper.
22 To implement the methodology we modiﬁed the procedure used by Arnold and Javorcik (2009), which itself is a modiﬁcation of psmatch2 of Leuven and
Sianesi (2010).
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5.1. Propensity score estimation
Table 4 shows the logit estimation results for the propensity score. Larger ﬁrms are more likely to participate than are
small ﬁrms as the coefﬁcient for total employment is positive and signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcients for log age is negative, but
for log age squared it is positive, and both coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant. Thus older and more established ﬁrms are more likely
to participate in assistance programs than are newly formed ones. The sector in which ﬁrms operate does not seem to affect
the participation decision. Firms with at least one worker with a university education are more likely to participate in assis-
tance programs. This may indicate that these ﬁrms are aware that external assistance in the form of training will boost their
productivity and lead to expansion or that their greater technical expertise may have made them more attractive to those
selecting ﬁrms for technical assistance programs. Firms that face greater competition from the black market underpartici-
pate, perhaps because they are in sectors where business skills and technical expertise are not important sources of compet-
itive strength, thus allowing small unregistered ﬁrms and black marketers to thrive. The difﬁculty of obtaining business
premises does not affect the likelihood of participation signiﬁcantly. Firms with internal cash ﬂow constraints are more likely
to participate. Such a lack of internal ﬁnancing may lead ﬁrms to participate in technical assistance programs that help them
with ﬁnancial planning andmanagement as well as in credit assistance programs to obtain external loans. On the other hand,
ﬁrms reporting a lack of access to external ﬁnance as an important barrier did not participate more frequently in USAID pro-
grams. Firms that had difﬁculty in obtaining workers with the appropriate skills were more likely to participate, but those
who found it hard to ﬁnd skilled managers tended not to participate in assistance programs. The pseudo R-squared of the
estimation is 0.175.
These explanatory variables and the regression results, especially in terms of the effect of ﬁrm size and age and of man-
agerial skills on the likelihood that a ﬁrmwill participate in a program of technical or ﬁnancial assistance, are quite similar to
the those used by Almus (2001) for Germany, Gabe and Kraybill (2002) for the US and Roper and Hewitt-Dundas (2001) for
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
After computing the propensity scores from the logit estimation above, we used them to match ﬁrms by year either using
caliper or kernel matching. This step should ensure that the treatment and new control group have similar characteristics.
The balancing tests discussed earlier show that the matching is successful. In Table 5, we test that each variable has the same
mean in the treatment and control groups. The t-tests are conducted before and after matching. We clearly see that before
matching the treatment group and control group had very different characteristics. But after matching we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the means are equal between the two groups. Also, the Hotelling T-test indicates that we cannot reject that
the means are jointly equal between the two groups. The third test is the pseudo R-squared. From Table 5, we see that, whileTable 4
Propensity score estimation.
Treated = 1 Coefﬁcient Std. err.
Continuous variables
Total employment 0.461*** 0.122
Log age 0.738* 0.459
Log age squared 0.227* 0.126
Dichotomous variables
Sector = industry 0.875 0.803
At least one employee has university degree 1.045*** 0.391
Perceived barriers to growtha
Competition from black market ﬁrms 0.635*** 0.198
Access to a business premises 0.231 0.234
Access to external ﬁnance 0.236 0.192
Availability of internal ﬁnance 0.800*** 0.201
Availability of inputs 0.420* 0.250
Availability of labor 0.343* 0.191
Legal disputes 0.242* 0.142
Availability of managers with appropriate skills 0.229* 0.121
No of observations 822
Chi2 73.29
P value 0.000
Pseudo R-squared 0.175
Notes: The table reports logit estimations. The standard errors are computed using bootstrapping. The model includes
an intercept term that is not reported.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁄⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
a For deﬁnitions of these variables and their coding, see Table 1.
Table 5
Balancing tests.
Variable Sample Mean t-test p > t
Treated Control t
Log(total employment before assistance) Unmatched 2.278 1.501 5.03 0
Matched 1.987 1.936 0.18 0.856
Log(age) Unmatched 1.833 1.870 0.32 0.747
Matched 1.764 2.031 1.28 0.205
Log(age)2 Unmatched 4.304 4.180 0.3 0.767
Matched 3.996 5.267 1.68 0.097
At least 1 employee has univ. degree sector = industry Unmatched 0.034 0.062 0.84 0.402
Matched 0.021 0.043 0.58 0.562
Unmatched 0.776 0.560 3.22 0.001
Matched 0.745 0.702 0.46 0.649
Barriers to growtha
Competition from black market ﬁrms Unmatched 1.207 1.584 2.89 0.004
Matched 1.298 1.298 0 1
Access to business premises Unmatched 0.552 0.551 0.01 0.995
Matched 0.574 0.702 0.76 0.45
Access to external ﬁnance Unmatched 1.207 1.130 0.61 0.544
Matched 1.149 1.170 0.09 0.925
Access to internal ﬁnance Unmatched 1.310 0.923 3.15 0.002
Matched 1.043 1.021 0.12 0.903
Availability of inputs Unmatched 0.690 0.640 0.52 0.603
Matched 0.702 0.702 0 1
Availability of labor Unmatched 0.966 0.736 1.94 0.053
Matched 0.745 0.809 0.35 0.724
Legal disputes Unmatched 0.879 1.124 1.15 0.251
Matched 0.894 0.894 0 1
Availability of managers with appropriate skills Unmatched 1.155 1.559 1.3 0.193
Matched 1.085 1.340 0.81 0.419
Hotelling t-test F-statistic 6.55 p-Value 0.00
LR test – Chi2 Unmatched 72.7 p-Value 0.00
Matched 6.37 p-Value 0.932
Pseudo R2 Unmatched 0.175
Matched 0.049
a For deﬁnitions of these variables and their coding, see Table 1.
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esis we test is that the variables in the logit estimation have no explanatory power after matching. The p-value of LR statistic
shows that this cannot be rejected. The kernel matching also passes all balancing tests.235.2. Estimates of treatment effects
In view of the previous discussion of the ﬁndings regarding the relative effectiveness of USAID ﬁnancial and technical
assistance to ﬁrms in Romania, we ﬁrst sought to test whether the treatment effects for the eight ﬁrms in our sample that
received ﬁnancial assistance differed from the treatment effects of the ﬁrms that received technical assistance. Unfortu-
nately, the small sample of ﬁrms receiving ﬁnancial assistance was further attenuated by the fact that most of the ﬁnancial
assistance was received toward the end of the sample period, so that we had three and two ﬁrms only for estimating the
treatment effects for employment growth two and 3 years after assistance respectively. This small sample size led to large
standard errors for the estimates of the treatment effects and we were thus not able to reject the hypothesis that the treat-
ment effects for the two groups of ﬁrms were the same. Thus, in the results that follow, we estimate a single treatment effect
for all assisted ﬁrms regardless of the type of assistance they received.
Tables 6 and 7 report the average treatment effect on all the treated ﬁrms’ employment growth using caliper and kernel
matching methods. For both methods we impose the assumption of common support. In the case of caliper matching, we do
not obtain matches for some treated ﬁrms. The number of ﬁrms that have matches is shown in Table 6, and it is invariant
within caliper values ranging from 0.01 to 0.2. This suggests that we are not matching treated ﬁrms whose propensity scores
appear to be quite different from those of ﬁrms in the control group and also that the ﬁrms for which we do have matches are
matched quite well. The standard deviations are computed using bootstrapping with 100 replications.24
We report the results for both full-time and total (including part-time) employment. The tables show that USAID assis-
tance had a positive effect on employment growth. The ATT is positive for all years after assistance. While the size of the23 The balancing tests for the kernel are not reported but are available upon request.
24 The bootstrap is computed by strata as the samples should be chosen by year.
Table 6
Treatment effect with caliper matching with caliper of 0.05 and full sample.
Assistance year One year later Two years later Three years later
Full-time employment 0.123 0.203* 0.293** 0.333*
(0.085) (0.115) (0.134) (0.185)
Total employment 0.126 0.214* 0.347** 0.402**
(0.082) (0.116) (0.152) (0.182)
Number of treated ﬁrms 58 58 47 34
Number of matches with caliper = 0.05 47 47 39 29
The table shows average treatment on the treated. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrapping. Results using a caliper of 0.01 and
0.20 excluded the same number of treated ﬁrms.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁄⁄⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 7
Treatment effect with kernel matching and full sample.
Assistance year One year later Two years later Three years later
Full-time employment 0.051 0.165** 0.201** 0.257*
(0.066) (0.082) (0.010) (0.144)
Total employment 0.054 0.177** 0.256** 0.330**
(0.061) (0.082) (0.129) (0.146)
No of observations 608 605 510 417
The table shows average treatment on the treated. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrapping.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁄⁄⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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both methods. For the caliper matching, the ATT estimates are larger than those for kernel matching. Full-time employment
growth differentials vary from 12.3% in the assistance year to 33.3% 3 years later. The range for total employment is from
12.6% to 40.2%. While the estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant during the assistance year, they are for the subsequent
years.
The ATT estimates from the kernel matching are somewhat lower than the caliper estimates. Both full-time and total
employment growth differentials are less than half of the caliper estimates in the year of assistance but more similar for sub-
sequent years. One year after assistance, the kernel estimate of the employment growth differential of treated ﬁrms over
untreated ﬁrms is 16.5% for full-time employment and 17.7% for total employment. By the end of the third year after assis-
tance, the growth differentials increase to 25.5% for full-time employment and 33% for total employment. For all estimates,
the effect of assistance on total employment growth is greater than the effect on full-time employment growth, suggesting
that assisted ﬁrms made greater use of part-time employees, a positive outcome because the greater availability of part-time
employment beneﬁts workers who do not want to work full-time and because part-time work is a valuable gateway to full-
time employment for young workers, who face serious barriers in ﬁnding work in Macedonia.
As mentioned in Section 3, six of the ﬁrms in our ample received both ﬁnancial and technical assistance in the same year.
To test whether there is a synergistic effect between the two kinds of assistance, we estimated the ATT for these six ﬁrms
alone. Unfortunately, this sample of ﬁrms, like those that received ﬁnancial assistance only or ﬁrst, had very few observa-
tions for employment growth 2 and 3 years following assistance. However, the estimated treatment effect for employment
growth in the year of assistance was signiﬁcant at the 5% level and about twice the ATT estimate for the entire sample of
ﬁrms for that year. Given the small sample on which these estimates are based, the conclusion that there are synergies be-
tween ﬁnancial and technical assistance, although commonsensical, should be treated less as a conclusive ﬁnding and more
as an avenue for further research.5.3. Robustness tests
Before comparing our results to those of other studies, we report two tests of robustness.25 As mentioned in Section 3, the
average size of treated ﬁrms was larger than that of the control group because of the presence of some very large ﬁrms in the
treated group. To test whether the presence of these large ﬁrms skewed our results, we eliminated all ﬁrms with more than 100
employees from our sample and repeated our propensity matching procedure using this reduced sample. Results for the caliper
test are reported in Table 8 for a caliper of 0.05 and the results of kernel matching are reported in Table 9. The reported results25 We thank a referee for suggesting these tests.
Table 8
Treatment effect with caliper matching with caliper of 0.05 for ﬁrms with 100 or fewer employees.
Assistance year One year later Two years later Three years later
Total employment 0.120 0.212* 0.356** 0.384**
(0.090) (0.124) (0.156) (0.212)
No of treated ﬁrms 52 52 42 32
No of matches with caliper = 0.05 38 38 31 23
The table shows average treatment on the treated. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrapping.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁄⁄⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 9
Treatment effect with kernel matching for ﬁrms with 100 or fewer employees.
Assistance year One year later Two years later Three years later
Total employment 0.035 0.171* 0.251* 0.302**
(0.115) (0.095) (0.137) (0.151)
No of treated ﬁrms 52 52 42 32
No of observations 805 714 616 524
The table shows average treatment on the treated. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrapping.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁄⁄⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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assistance in our sample did not skew the results reported for the full sample.
Since the main thrust of USAID assistance to Macedonian ﬁrms took the form of programs designed to improve managers’
business and technical skills, a natural question to ask is whether those ﬁrms that felt that the lack of such skills was a major
barrier to their growth consequently beneﬁted more from USAID programs that addressed these skill shortages. To test for
this we separated the ﬁrms in our sample into two groups, those that reported that the lack of managers with appropriate
skills was not a barrier to their growth, and ﬁrms that reported that the lack of such skills was a moderate or serious barrier
to growth. We then repeated the propensity scoring procedure, and we report the results of the caliper matching process for
the two groups of ﬁrms in Tables 10 and 11 and for the kernel matching process in Tables 12 and 13. While the results should
be treated with caution given the small number of treated ﬁrms in each category, the results of the two matching methods
point to the same conclusion. Firms that reported that the lack of appropriate managerial skills was not a barrier to growth
exhibited no signiﬁcant increase in growth as the result of participation in USAID programs. Firms that did report that lack of
managerial skills was a barrier to their growth, on the other hand, experienced a signiﬁcant increase in growth after partic-
ipating in USAID programs. This suggests that Macedonian mangers could identify if a lack of business and technical skills
was a barrier to ﬁrm growth and that USAID programs were able to improve participants’ business and technical skills in
ways that had tangible effects on ﬁrm performance.5.4. Comparison to other results
In Table 14 we compare our results to those of studies of the effectiveness of assistance programs for ﬁrms carried out in
other countries. This comparison should be treated with some care, as each country’s assistance program was quite different
in the type of aid provided, in the type of ﬁrms targeted for assistance, and in the amount and duration of assistance pro-Table 10
Treatment effect with caliper matching with caliper of 0.05 for treated ﬁrms which reported that unavailability of appropriate managerial skills is not a barrier
to growth.
Assistance year One year later Two years later Three years later
Total employment 0.051 0.250 0.206 0.332
(0.273) (0.335) (0.497) (0.404)
No of treated ﬁrms 27 27 22 14
No of matches with caliper = 0.05 9 9 8 5
The table shows average treatment on the treated. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrapping.
⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁄⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁄⁄⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 11
Treatment effect with caliper matching with caliper of 0.05 for treated ﬁrms which reported that unavailability of appropriate managerial skills is a barrier to
growth.
Assistance year One year later Two years later Three years later
Total employment 0.047 0.297* 0.466* 0.471**
(0.087) (0.189) (0.255) (0.199)
No of treated ﬁrms 31 31 25 20
No of matches with caliper = 0.05 21 21 18 14
The table shows average treatment on the treated. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrapping.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁄⁄⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 12
Treatment effect with kernel matching for treated ﬁrms which reported that unavailability of appropriate managerial skills is not a barrier to growth.
Assistance year One year later Two years later Three years later
Total employment 0.056 0.151 0.258 0.284
(0.128) (0.176) (0.224) (0.559)
No of treated ﬁrms 27 27 22 14
No of observations 343 304 261 220
The table shows average treatment on the treated. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrapping.
⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁄⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁄⁄⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 13
Treatment effect with kernel matching for treated ﬁrms which reported that unavailability of appropriate managerial skills is a barrier to growth.
Assistance year One year later Two years later Three years later
Total employment 0.019 0.248 0.308** 0.311***
(0.067) (0.171) (0.163) (0.119)
No of treated Firms 31 31 25 20
No of observations 479 426 369 314
The table shows average treatment on the treated. The standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrapping.
⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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use matching methods similar to those employed in this paper, but others use different methods, mainly panel estimations
that use ﬁrm characteristics to account for selectivity bias.26 Nevertheless, we note that most of the studies, except Brown
et al. (2005) and Almus (2001), ﬁnd ﬁrst year effects that are similar in magnitude to ours. Moreover, many of the studies also
ﬁnd that assistance has longer-lasting effects on employment growth that continue to lead to higher employment growth for a
number of years after ﬁrms receive assistance. Despite differences in countries studied, program design, sample size and econo-
metric methodology, our results fall within the range of estimates provided by other studies for both transition and market
economies.
Because we lack information about both the number of Macedonian ﬁrms that received USAID assistance and the costs of
individual assistance programs, we are not able to estimate these programs’ cost effectiveness. In our search for names of
ﬁrms that had received USAID assistance in Macedonia, we did identify 786 ﬁrms that had participated in a USAID assistance
program for which we were able to identify at least three Macedonian participants. If these ﬁrms had the same average level
of employment as the ﬁrms in our ‘‘assisted’’ sample, then, in the ﬁrst year after assistance, between 5900 and 7400 addi-
tional jobs would have been created, and this number would have increased in subsequent years, as the results reported in
Tables 6 and 7 indicate. Such increases, sustained for a number of years, should have a signiﬁcant impact on the labor market
in a country the size of Macedonia.26 In this respect the study by the Ministry of Economic Development of New Zealand (2009) is instructive because its authors provide estimates from the
same data using both panel and matching methods. The conclusions obtained by the two methods are quite similar. Thus estimates obtained by different
estimation methods may be comparable.
Table 14
Comparison of assistance effects.
Study Country Type of assistance Estimation
methoda
Increase in employment growth relative to growth of
unassisted ﬁrms
This study Macedonia Technical and
Financial
Matching 17–21% points higher in 1st year, 26–40 points higher by
3rd year
Almus (2001) Germany Financial Parametric Seven percentage points higher -effect lasts 6 years
Brown and Earle (2009) Romania Financial Matching Twenty percentage points in 1st year, by 5th year grows to
40
Brown et al. (2005) Romania Technical and
Financialb
Panel Four percentage points higher than average growth of 6%
Min. of Dev. (2009) New Zealand Technical and
Financial
Matching and
Panel
(Value added): 4–18 percentage points higher in ﬁrst year
Roper and Hewitt-Dundas
(2001)
Ireland and N.
Ireland
Technical and
Financial
Panel 10–20 percentage points higher over 3 years
Wren and Storey (2002) UK Technical Panel 10–20% growth of employment after assistance –
depending on ﬁrm size
a Panel and parametric estimates use ﬁrm characteristics to control for selection bias.
b Only ﬁnancial aid has a signiﬁcant effect on employment.
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One key lesson from these results is that USAID-assisted ﬁrms increase both full-time and part-time employment at a
much faster rate than do ﬁrms that did not receive assistance. Also the assistance has a lasting impact on employment
growth. Thus we conclude that USAID provision of assistance to Macedonian ﬁrms had a signiﬁcant effect on their ability
to expand employment. The effectiveness of technical assistance is particularly important from a policy perspective in that
some types of technical assistance programs, such as seminars that provide managerial skills and technical updates to
attendees, could be expanded at relatively low marginal costs.
Our ability to extend our results is limited by the nature of the data available to us, but we note some areas where addi-
tional research is warranted. Although many studies evaluate assistance programs on the basis of employment or sales
growth as well as of survival rates, the integration of survival rate effects with job growth effects would be an important
next step for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that many SMEs fail soon after startup, and thus assistance that helps ﬁrms survive
may have employment effects that are as important as the increase in employment in ﬁrms that receive assistance and sur-
vive. Several studies cited in Section 2 do measure the effect of assistance on ﬁrm survival, but with contradictory results.27
A second area that deserves further research is that of crowding-out effects. While researchers ﬁnd positive effects of
assistance on the performance of individual ﬁrms, such effects tend to be smaller or to disappear entirely at the sectoral
or aggregate level. This may be evidence that the ﬁrms that receive assistance prosper at the expense of other ﬁrms in their
sector. As a result, the net employment effect seen at the ﬁrm level is not replicated at the aggregate level because ﬁrm
growth within a sector is something of a zero-sum game where gains in productivity, sales and employment in assisted ﬁrms
come at the expense of unassisted competitors.
A ﬁnal issue that is neglected in this paper and in a number of other studies of the effectiveness of assistance programs is
that of the costs and beneﬁts of such assistance. Generally, programs that show a positive effect on employment or on other
performance indicators in treated ﬁrms are deemed successful regardless of the costs of delivering this assistance. This is
partly due to the difﬁculty of measuring, or obtaining data on, the administrative and direct costs of assistance programs
as well as of valuing the gains in employment or growth in treated ﬁrms in monetary terms. Some studies that do undertake
such cost beneﬁt analysis, such as Hart and Gudgin (1999) or Gabe and Kraybill (2002), ﬁnd that creating jobs through assis-
tance to SMEs is a costly process. On the other hand, Wren and Storey (2002) ﬁnd the technical assistance programs they
examine in the UK to have ‘‘remarkably strong impacts, which indicate that the scheme was highly cost-effective.’’ Thus,
reﬁning the success criteria for assistance programs to ﬁrms in transition economies to go beyond estimates of higher job
growth and higher survival rates to include cost beneﬁt analysis more explicitly is also an important next step.Acknowledgments
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